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Abstract. The European ‘penal climate’ is defined by consistent patterns of difference 
in penal policies that are well known and well documented. One such pattern involves 
differences between ‘old’ EU member states in Western Europe and ‘new’ EU member 
states, in Central and Eastern Europe. The two above zones of European ‘penal climate’ 
differ not only in the severity of sanctions imposed (as measured by imprisonment 
rate, average length of prison sentences, and average time spent in prison), but also in 
other characteristics of sentencing patterns, including types of sanctions used and their 
structure. This paper presents selected statistical data regarding differences in penal 
policies implemented in Western and Central and Eastern Europe, compared with the 
police data on registered offences. Comparison of the two data sets gives insight to the 
state of crime control policies in European countries.
Key words: penal climate – penal policy – punitiveness – imprisonment rate – 
alternatives to imprisonment
The term ‘penal climate’ (Steenhuis et al. 1983; Kommer 1994), although 
not a precise notion, serves to generally illustrate differences in penal policy 
and punitiveness among various countries or regions. Thus, it is possible to 
speak about a mild, moderate, or severe ‘penal climate’ prevailing in a given 
country, region, or continent. The European penal climate is defined by 
consistent patterns of difference in penal policies that are well known and well 
documented (Christie 2000, pp. 25–39).
One such pattern involves differences between ‘old’ EU member states 
located in Western Europe and ‘new’ EU member states, and other states located 
in Central and Eastern Europe. It is well known that enormous differences in 
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penal climates existed in Europe during the cold war, with penal moderation 
prevailing in the west, and severity dominating in the east. However, much 
data suggest that twenty-five years after the end of the cold war, the fall of 
the Berlin wall, and the collapse of the communist regimes in Central and 
Eastern Europe, two different climatic zones persist. The European continent 
remains divided, with a mild or moderate western zone and a severe central 
and eastern zone. The difference from twenty-five years ago to today is that 
the current ‘penal curtain’ dividing Europe into these two zones, as opposed 
to the ‘iron curtain’ of the cold war period, moved eastwards from the Elbe 
River (formerly the border between Western and Eastern Germany) to the 
Odra River (currently the border between Germany and Poland). This eastern 
shift occurred as a consequence of German unification when the former GDR 
joined the moderate western penal climate.
The two different zones of European penal climate differ not only in the 
severity of sanctions imposed (as measured by imprisonment rate, average 
length of prison sentences, and average time spent in prison), but also in other 
characteristics of sentencing patterns, including types of sanctions used and 
their structure. This paper presents selected statistical data regarding such 
differences in penal policies implemented in Western and Central and Eastern 
Europe. Some of those data create striking patterns of consistency. Those data 
are compared with the statistical data on crime patterns, primarily police 
data on registered offences. It is interesting that also in this area substantial 
differences exist between Western and Eastern Europe, although of an 
unexpected character. Comparison of the two data sets gives insight into the 
state of crime and crime control policies in European countries.
Police statistical data on registered offences constitute the most important 
source of official statistical data on crime in European countries. The European 
Sourcebook on Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics provides data on registered 
offence rates per 100,000 population in all member states of the Council of 
Europe since 1995 (Killias et al. 2003; Aebi et al. 2006; Aebi et al. 2010). For 
the purpose of the current analysis, data for three selected years 1995, 2000 
and 20071 are used to illustrate patterns of differentiation among European 
countries and changes in those patterns. Figures 1, 2, and 3 list European 
countries by rank according to their registered offence rate. 
1  2007 is the last year for which the data are available in Aebi et al. 2010.
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It is possible to argue that using police statistical data on registered 
offences to make such comparisons is useless and completely wrong from the 
methodological point of view (van Dijk 2008, pp. 15–43; Lewis 2012). Crime 
is not a ‘natural’ but a normative phenomenon. What constitutes a criminal 
offence is decided by the law and results from a law-making process undertaken 
mostly at the national level. In consequence, there is no such thing as a unified, 
supra-national notion of what constitutes a criminal offence. Therefore, what 
is considered to be a crime depends on the definitions of offences provided by 
FIG. 1. Crime rate in European countries (1995)
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FIG. 2. Crime rate in European countries  (2000)
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the domestic legal system of any country. Those vary significantly. Even when 
there is no doubt about certain ‘common core’ offences recognized by most 
national legislations in Europe and worldwide, the margin of difference is still 
substantial. The growing tendency to approximate criminal law, especially 
in the EU, because of international obligations or supranational legislation, 
does not change this. The scope of criminalization differs substantially in the 
precise meaning and details of such notions as rape, theft, burglary, robbery, or 
fraud in each European country. 
Also, police statistics in any country may record different categories of 
prohibited acts. In some countries they record practically all types of norm 
violations independently of their character, including various petty violations 
(primarily true in Anglo-American and Scandinavian legal cultures). In other 
countries, such statistics record often only what is called criminal offences of 
more serious character, while all kinds of administrative offences are registered 
in separate statistical systems (as seems to be the case in Poland, Germany, or 
Austria). Therefore, the latter group of countries may have lower registered 
offence rates than the former group, even though the only reason for this may 
result from differences in statistical registration and not real differences in the 
phenomenon to be measured (i.e. crime).
Finally, countries may differ substantially with regard to certain factors 
having crucial importance for the process of official registration of offences by 
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FIG. 3. Crime rate in European countries (2007)
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the police. On the one hand, it is readiness of the victims to report offences to the 
police, on the other, it is readiness of the police to register such reports. Victim 
readiness constitutes a well-known factor influencing registered offence rate 
and may be effectively measured by victimization surveys. Police readiness is a 
more elusive factor, although it played a significant role in Central and Eastern 
European countries before 1990, when communist authorities for ideological 
reasons tried to keep crime rate low by manipulating registration processes. 
In a country where both kinds of readiness are low, its registered offence rate 
may be much lower than in a country where both kinds of readiness are high. 
This may have nothing to do with the real number of offences committed 
in those countries. Another crucial factor may be the selection mechanisms 
present in any criminal justice system, for example as in juvenile justice in 
which discretionary powers are strongly rooted.  German juvenile offense 
rates – at least during the 1990s – were much higher than in the Central 
European countries like Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland; however, these 
different rates most probably reflected differences in the selection mechanisms 
functioning in those countries and not real differences in incidence of juvenile 
delinquency. In Germany, offences were first formally registered and only then 
‘dropped’ from the juvenile justice system, using various discretionary powers. 
In the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, offences were ‘selected out’ in 
an informal way by the police before being formally registered, and therefore 
many such incidents left no traces whatsoever in the statistical registration 
system (Neubacher et al. 1999).
For these reasons, official police statistical data on registered offences 
are usually considered to be of no great value for the purpose of making 
international comparisons. No one would readily accept that Sweden is the 
least safe European country because it has the highest registered offence rate, 
while Russia is much safer, or that Romania is the safest country because it 
has a substantially lower registered offence rates than any in Europe. In other 
words, any international comparisons involving registered offence rates must 
be treated with due caution. Registered offence numbers and rates are to a large 
extent – although not completely – independent of the real number of criminal 
law violations taking place in any country and are influenced by many factors 
not directly related to the real volume of crime.
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All three diagrams reveal a consistent pattern of difference in registered 
offence rates. Western European countries are generally characterized by higher, 
sometimes much higher, registered offence rates than Central and Eastern 
European countries. For example, the average registered offence rate for 14 
countries of Western Europe, listed in Figure 3, in the year 2007 was 7,383 per 
100,000 inhabitants, while for 11 Central and Eastern European countries it 
was 2,858 per 100,000. Therefore, in Western Europe the offence rate was on 
average more than twice as high as in Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, 
this pattern persisted throughout the entire analysed period, independently of 
the changes in registered offence rates that took place in each country or region.
This may be somewhat surprising. After the year 1989, a substantial 
growth of registered offence rates took place in all post-communist countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe. Despite the fact that many countries of 
the region lack reliable statistical data on crime for the period before 1989 
(which makes comparisons sometimes difficult), this growth is usually well 
documented (Gruszczyńska 2004; Lévay 2012; Gruszczyńska and Heiskanen 
2012). Even if there are problems with ascertaining how big was the crime 
growth in the region as compared with the period before 1990, there is no 
doubt that in most countries of the region crime was growing significantly 
throughout the 1990s and often continued during the 2000s. This growth 
is reflected in public perceptions of crime, as well as in political and media 
discourse. Crime growth was perceived by criminologists and the public as 
one of the most conspicuous characteristics of the political, economic, and 
social transformation processes in Central and Eastern Europe (Kossowska et 
al. 2012). However, it is important to note that never during the last 25 years 
and in none of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe did the registered 
offence rate approach the average rates for Western Europe. Nevertheless, 
most people in Central and Eastern Europe are deeply convinced that after 
1989 their countries rapidly became high-crime societies (Garland 2000), in 
sharp contrast with the safe West. Contrary to that opinion and compared with 
Western Europe, countries of Central and Eastern Europe remain low-crime 
societies, at least according to the official police data on registered offences.
The above picture may change if we use data regarding particular offences 
and not data on all registered offences taken together. For example, it is often 
argued that data on homicide better suit the purpose of making international 
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comparisons. First, homicide is an offence similarly defined in most European 
jurisdictions2. Second, registration of homicide is certainly less influenced by 
the readiness of people to report offences and the readiness of the police to 
record them than any other offence. Homicide may be considered to be an 
offence with a relatively small dark figure, in that its official rate approximates 
its real occurrence in a given society. Therefore, some authors are of the opinion 
that registered homicide rates are a better indicator for drawing conclusions 
regarding differences in crime among countries (Jasiński 1996). This may 
be partly true, although it may be well argued that registered homicide rates 
indicate the level of criminal violence in a country and not necessarily the 
general level of crime. Nevertheless, it may be worth looking at the differences 
in registered homicide rates in Western Europe on the one side of the penal 
curtain, and Central and Eastern Europe on the other.
Data regarding the rates of registered completed homicides in European 
countries for the years 1995, 2000 and 2007 are presented in Figures 4, 5, and 
6. The pattern here clearly differs from the pattern of general offences. Here, 
most Central and Eastern European countries score higher than countries of 
Western Europe, and this is true for the entire period under analysis. Moreo-
ver, some Central and Eastern European countries are undisputed European 
leaders in registered completed homicides, primarily the Baltic countries3 and 
Bulgaria. Moreover, none of the countries of the region belong to the group 
of European countries with the lowest homicide rate. For example, in the year 
2007, the average rate of completed homicides for 11 Western European coun-
tries, listed in Figure 6, is 1.25 per 100,000 population, while for 8 Central 
and Eastern European countries the average rate is 3.1 per 100,000. However, 
if Estonia and Lithuania, countries having exceedingly high homicide rates, 
are excluded, then the average completed homicide rate for the remaining six 
countries of the region is 1.7 per 100,000. Therefore, the average Central and 
2  This does not mean that homicide is defined identically. Therefore, certain particularities, 
especially regarding criminal intent, may impact the differences in registered homicide 
rates, but certainly those differences are less significant than those of other offences.
3 The European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice provides data on completed 
homicide for Estonia and Lithuania only. There are no such data on Latvia. However, 
judging from the data on Latvia regarding intentional homicide (both completed and 
attempted), this country may have a slightly lower homicide rate than the other two 
Baltic countries, but still significantly above the European average.
 KRZYSZTOF KRAJEWSKI.  Dif ferent penal  cl imates in Europe 93
Eastern European rate is higher than in Western Europe, but by no means 
drastically higher. At the same time, unlike the data pattern regarding gen-
eral offence rate, there is no clear pattern of differentiation in homicide rate 
between the continental West and the East. It is true that all European coun-
tries with the lowest homicide rates are Western countries, and those with the 
highest homicide rates are Central and Eastern European countries. How-
ever, in the middle of the ranking range, there are some western countries 
FIG. 4. Homicide rate in European countries (1995)
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FIG. 5. Homicide rate in European countries (2000)
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with rates absolutely comparable with some Central and Eastern European 
countries.
It is difficult to say whether offence rates or homicide rates better reflect 
differences in real incidence of crime between Western Europe and Central 
and Eastern Europe. Unfortunately, there are no victimization survey time 
series data available for all European countries, which makes it impossible 
to create a more comprehensive and reliable picture of differences in crime 
among European countries. This is especially true for countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe for which data obtained through International Crime 
and Victims Survey (ICVS) are available only for Poland for a longer period 
of time. Estonia and Hungary were included only in the 2004–2005 ICVS 
sweep (van Dijk et al. 2007). Nevertheless, the available data on victimiza-
tion reveal a more complex and differentiated picture of crime patterns than 
the data regarding registered offences. For example, for the years 2004–2005 
Poland had a victimization prevalence rate of 15.0, which is almost identical 
with the European average of 15.4. Estonia had a much higher prevalence 
with the rate of 20.2, but in Hungary it was much lower, with the rate of 10.0. 
There were equally substantial differences among the countries of Western 
Europe, ranging from a very high victimization rate in Ireland (21.9) or the 
United Kingdom (21.0) to a rather low rate in Portugal (10.4) or Spain (9.1). 
This seems to suggest that there may be no consistent pattern of differentia-
FIG. 6. Homicide rate in European countries (2008)
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tion in real crime levels between the Western and the Central and Eastern 
continent.
This paper does not aim to provide a definite answer to the question 
whether the data on registered offence rates (general or by offence type) reflect 
real differences in crime levels among European countries or they are simply 
statistical artefacts, products of differences in counting rules and differences in 
the dimensions of the dark figure. For the purpose of the following analysis, it 
is sufficient to conclude that during the last 25 years all countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe were characterized by substantially lower registered offence 
rates than in the West. Consequently, those countries have had a much lower 
‘input’ of cases to be processed by their criminal justice systems than their 
Western counterparts, which is of profound importance for the evaluation of 
crime control policies. Because readiness to report victimization in Central 
and Eastern Europe is still substantially lower than on average in the West, 
offences are significantly ‘under-registered’; in other words, the proportion of 
offences remaining in the dark figure is much higher in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Therefore, it would be false to conclude that Central and Eastern 
Europe have less crime than the West. But it is not important to determine 
whether Central and Eastern Europe have less or more crimes than Western 
Europe. What counts for the current argument is that the input of cases to 
be decided by the criminal justice system in any country is determined by 
the number of registered offences and not by the number of offences actually 
committed. Only officially registered offences may be processed by the 
criminal justice system, subject to sentencing or other decisions, and therefore 
are of significance for the evaluation of the ‘penal climate’ prevailing in a given 
country.
In this context, it must be even more striking that countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe are commonly known for their rather harsh criminal justice 
systems and sentencing patterns as compared with Western Europe. These 
countries were known for extremely high levels of punitiveness before 1989, 
which was understandable considering their authoritarian political systems 
imposed by Soviet dominance. But it seems that, despite political changes in 
1989, the situation did not alter substantially. This may be illustrated by data 
regarding the imprisonment rate in European countries, the indicator most 
commonly used for the purpose of comparative analysis of punitiveness. The 
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data regarding this rate for the years 1983, 1995, 2000, and 2007 are presented 
in Figures 7, 8, 9, and 104.
The data reveal an astonishingly consistent pattern of differences in 
imprisonment rates or punitiveness of European countries since 1983. 
Moreover, despite changes in numbers for specific years, the ranking pattern 
changed very little since the communist period. Even considering that there 
are substantial differences in imprisonment rates among Central and Eastern 
European countries (with excessively high rates in the Baltic countries, even 
for the prevailing conditions), almost all countries of the region lead in the 
ranking of European countries in terms of imprisonment rate. The only 
exception among the post-communist countries is Slovenia which for years 
has been among the European champions of ‘low imprisonment rate’. This 
pattern has persisted since the communist era without change, despite the 
political, economic, and social change in Central and Eastern Europe since 
1989, including reforms in the criminal justice system and penal law. This is so, 
even though in absolute terms the imprisonment rate in Central and Eastern 
Europe usually diminished as compared with the period before 1989, while 
in Western Europe it usually increased, sometimes even substantially (Kuhn 
1994; Lappi-Seppälä 2011).
The above picture is nothing new, and all presented data are well known; 
however, they illustrate that during the last 25 years the post-communist 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe were unable to introduce to their 
penal policies changes significant enough to equal the Western European 
average imprisonment rate, or at least to approach this average in a meaningful 
way. Moreover, this is obviously the consequence of highly punitive penal law 
and criminal justice systems and not of the situation regarding crime. Public 
opinion, media, and politicians in the region are often deeply convinced that just 
the opposite is true: that criminal justice systems in the region are excessively 
lenient, and crime is getting out of control (Krajewski 2009). Therefore, there 
is a widespread belief that increasing punishment for crimes and increasing 
the number of offenders sent to prison constitute the panacea for crime. What 
4 Data for the year 1983 are taken from Jasiński (1984), pp. 52–66. Data for the year 1995 
are taken from Killias et al. (2003) p. 196, and for the year 2000 from Aebi et al. (2006), 
p. 129. Finally, the source of data for the year 2008 is Aebi, Delgrande (2010), p. 27. The 
rates are calculated per 100,000 population.
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is completely ignored is that sentencing policies in Central and Eastern Europe 
are already harsh and result in prison populations of enormous dimensions.
From this point of view, it may be worth having a closer look at some 
additional data regarding sentencing patterns in the region. Imprisonment, 
or the frequency of imposing sanctions of deprivation of liberty rather than 
alternative sanctions, is an important factor in sanction structure. Data on 
FIG. 7. Imprisonment rate in European countries (1983)
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FIG. 8. Imprisonment rate in European countries (1995)
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the proportion of immediate imprisonment sentences among all sentences 
pronounced in European countries are provided for the years 1999 and 2007 
(i.e. two years for which data are available) in Figures 11 and 125. These data 
5 Data regarding the structure of sanctions imposed by the criminal justice systems in 
European countries are available in The European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal 
Justice Statistics only for the years 1999 and 2007.
FIG. 9. Imprisonment rate in European countries  (2000)
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FIG. 10. Imprisonment rate in European countries (2008)
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clearly illustrate that European countries differ enormously with respect to the 
role played by imprisonment in their penal policies, and that, in principle, this 
differentiation is not clearly related to geographical criteria. The frequent use 
of imprisonment by no means constitutes a consistent pattern in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Therefore, it cannot be the main factor underlying the punitive 
FIG. 11. Proportion of immediate prison sentences in European 
countries  (1999)
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FIG. 12. Proportion of immediate prison sentences in European  
countries (2007)
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outcomes of crime control policies. Some countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe do lead in the use of imprisonment, primarily Romania, Bulgaria, 
Lithuania, and Latvia. However, there are also countries of the region, such as 
the Czech Republic or Slovakia, with the proportions of imprisonment sentences 
that are more or less within the European average (especially true for 2007), 
but still lower than in many countries of Western Europe (such as Austria, 
France or the Netherlands). Finally, there are countries of the region with the 
imprisonment proportions that are low by European standards (Poland), or even 
very low (Hungary). Hungary is absolutely comparable with European leaders in 
a restrained use of imprisonment, namely Finland and Germany. Moreover, there 
seems to be little relation between the proportion of imprisonment sentences 
imposed by courts in a given country and its imprisonment rate. Some countries 
(Hungary, Poland, Portugal, and England and Wales) have a low proportion of 
imprisonment sentences and a high or even very high imprisonment rate. In 
other countries, the opposite is true. Slovenia provides the most astonishing 
example. In 2007, Slovenia held the record for European standards in its 
proportion of imprisonment sentences at more than 80 percent, while at the 
same time it had for years the lowest, or one of the lowest, imprisonment rates. 
This is rather easy to explain. The problem is not only how often offenders are 
sent to serve prison sentences but also how long are sentences being imposed 
or – even more important – how much time in fact convicts spend behind bars. 
The frequent use of short-term imprisonment may result in a high proportion 
of such sentences among all sanctions imposed, but it not necessarily results in a 
high imprisonment rate. What matters is not only the stock of prisoners, but also 
their flow (Aebi, Kuhn 2000). 
Therefore, it may be necessary to use some other measures to compare 
specific aspects of the use of imprisonment in European countries. One such 
measure may be the rate illustrating the number of immediate imprisonment 
sentences imposed per 100.000 registered offences, which is especially useful 
in evaluating the role of imprisonment in any country’s penal policy, because it 
relates the frequency of application of this sanction to the number of registered 
offences, i.e. to the input to the criminal justice system. Because only registered 
offences, or, to be more precise, only registered and cleared offences are subject 
to penal policies, real crime and dark figures are completely irrelevant. Offences 
not known to the police cannot be processed by the criminal justice system 
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and, therefore, are not subject to any sentencing decisions. What matters are 
registered offences. Even if a given country is known for having a rather large 
dark figure of crime like most Central and Eastern European countries, this 
is irrelevant from the point of view of indicators characterizing sentencing 
policies. Due to the lack of victimization surveys before 1989, we cannot say 
anything certain about real changes in crime in Central and Eastern Europe as 
compared with the communist period. We know only that in most countries of 
the region the number of registered offences increased substantially during the 
1990s. However, despite this increase, throughout the entire period after 1989 
the registered offence rate in Central and Eastern Europe was consistently 
lower than in Western Europe. This means that Central and Eastern Europe’s 
comparably lower volume of registered offences, when processed by the 
criminal justice system, results in a much higher imprisonment rate than in 
Western Europe. This suggests that the lower volume of crime in the region is 
dealt with more punitive means than in the West, including a more frequent 
use of immediate imprisonment. 
Unfortunately, although data on the numbers of offences registered in 
European countries are commonly available, data on the absolute numbers 
of imprisonment sentences imposed are not provided by the existing sources 
of international statistical data on crime and criminal justice. These sources 
provide data only on the proportion of such sentences among all sanctions 
imposed. Therefore, the above-mentioned rate of imprisonment sentences per 
100,000 registered offences is impossible to calculate. What is only available 
are the absolute numbers of people in prison (prison population). This makes 
it possible to calculate the rate of people being imprisoned per 100.000 
registered offences. This rate does not involve the number of immediate 
imprisonment sentences imposed by the courts, in other words, data directly 
regarding patterns of sentencing. Instead, it involves the data illustrating the 
outcomes of those patterns, because the number of imprisoned people is an 
outcome of sentencing patterns. It is clear that the prison population in any 
country consists not only of persons sentenced to imprisonment, but also of 
those kept in preliminary detention pending investigation and trial. It may 
be argued that the higher the proportion of those in preliminary detention 
among the imprisoned, the greater is the distortion which results from using 
the numbers of persons imprisoned instead of the number of imprisonment 
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sentences imposed. However, it may be well argued that preliminary detention 
in most instances is used in serious cases only, which involve a high probability 
of imprisonment sentence. In fact, in most criminal justice systems, those who 
are kept in preliminary detention, unless acquitted, are usually sentenced 
to serve an imprisonment sentence. Therefore, the distortion is probably 
not substantial. Moreover, the purpose of the proposed rate is not to create 
a precise measure, but rather to approximate certain patterns. Given the 
above caveats, the data regarding the proposed rate of persons imprisoned 
per 100.000 registered offences for the years 1999 and 2008 are presented in 
Figures 13 and 146.
Ranking European countries according to the rate of persons imprisoned 
per 100,000 registered offences perfectly reveals a deep division between 
Central and Eastern Europe and Western Europe. Except Slovenia, all 
countries with the highest rate of persons imprisoned per 100,000 registered 
offences in Europe are Central and Eastern European countries. Moreover, 
differences across the division are enormous. Even the highest-rating Western 
countries have rates several times lower than the highest-rating Central and 
Eastern European countries. This concerns not only Russia, which is notorious 
in terms of severity of its criminal justice system, but also the Baltic states, 
Bulgaria, and Romania. It seems also that the rate of persons imprisoned per 
100.000 registered offences strongly correlates with the imprisonment rate 
and therefore confirms that imprisonment is used much more frequently in 
Central and Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. In purely descriptive 
terms, this rate reveals yet another dimension of a clear differentiation of the 
‘penal climate’ prevailing in Europe.
For various reasons, the reliability of the rate of persons imprisoned per 
100.000 registered offences may be limited. The main problem, mentioned 
above, is that the lower rate of registered offences in Central and Eastern 
Europe most probably results from much bigger dimensions of the dark 
6 Calculations by the author using the data regarding the number of prisoners, i.e. 
persons in preliminary detention and persons convicted in a given year, provided in 
M. Killias et al. (2003), p. 196, and in Aebi, Delgrande (2010), p. 27, and the data on 
the number of registered offences in European countries in the years 1999 and 2008 
available from the database of EUROSTAT at http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/
show.do?dataset=crim_gen&lang=en. For Russia, the data on the number of registered 
offences for the year 2005 and for the Netherlands for 2007 were used.
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number of offences than in Western Europe, which result from a substantially 
lower readiness of people to report cases of victimization to the police. It 
may be reasonably assumed that this readiness to report is lowest in cases 
of petty offences, especially petty property offences. In cases of more serious 
offences, especially serious violent offences, the reporting rate is probably 
much higher. Therefore, it may be that petty offences are significantly ‘under-
registered’ in Central and Eastern Europe, and this distorts the structure of 
registered offences in that the proportion of registered serious offences in the 
region is higher than in the West. This may have serious consequences for 
the criminal justice system and sentencing outcomes. As discussed above, 
registered offences constitute the input to the criminal justice system. If more 
serious offences are ‘over-represented’ in such input, this may result in a more 
severe sentencing practice, particularly in using imprisonment sentences more 
often. In other words, the more frequent use of imprisonment may result not 
from a higher punitiveness of the criminal law and of sentencing practice, but 
simply from the fact that judges in Central and Eastern Europe in everyday 
practice deal on average with more serious offences than their western 
counterparts who process much more of petty crimes. This is, of course, only 
a general assumption. Its verification may be extremely difficult and its effects 
impossible to measure precisely. Therefore, clear patterns emerging from the 
data presented in Figures 12 and 13 must be treated with due caution. At the 
same time, it seems that even a precise measurement of differences in the 
dimensions and structure of the dark field of crimes and of their impact on 
sentencing outcomes would not change the established pattern of differences 
in regard to the proposed rate. What might diminish would be only the 
distance between the differences dividing the continent.
The established patterns of differences between the two parts of the 
European continent in regard to the use of imprisonment and the resulting 
differences in imprisonment rate are not the only striking differences in 
sentencing policies between Western and Central and Eastern Europe. Equally 
substantial differences seem to exist in use of alternatives for imprisonment, 
particularly suspended sentences and fines. Relevant data regarding these two 
types of sanctions for the years 1999 and 2007 are provided respectively in 
Figures 15, 16, 17 and 18.
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The data presented in these figures show that there are clear differences in 
the use of suspended sentences and fines between both parts of the European 
continent. With the exception of Hungary and (in 2007) Lithuania, all Central 
and Eastern European countries were leaders in the use of suspended sentences 
in 1999 and 2007. In eight countries of the region, the proportion of suspended 
sentences imposed in the year 2007 averaged to 34.6 percent, while in the 
remaining 11 countries of Western Europe the proportion averaged to 16.4 
FIG. 13. Prisoners per 100,000 registered offences in European 
countries (1999) 
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FIG. 14. Prisoners per 100,000 registered offences in European 
countries (2008) 
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percent. Therefore, a suspended sentence was the most important alternative 
to imprisonment throughout Central and Eastern Europe. The situation is 
just the opposite in Western Europe in which fines are the most important 
alternative to imprisonment and, in many cases, the most important instrument 
of sentencing policy and the most often used penal sanction. Comparatively, 
in Central and Eastern Europe (with the exception of Hungary in the year 
1999), the role of fines was small, even marginal. This may be illustrated well 
FIG. 15. Proportion of suspended sentences in European  
countries (1999)
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FIG. 16. Proportion of suspended sentences in European countries  (2007)
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FIG. 17. Proportion of fines in European countries (1999)
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FIG. 18. Proportion of fines in European countries (2007)
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by the fact that, in the year 2007, in 11 countries of Western Europe fines 
averaged to 63.2 percent of all sentences imposed, whereas in Central and 
Eastern Europe this proportion averaged to 14.7 percent. The line dividing the 
European continent into two separate zones of ‘penal climate’ seems yet again 
to be clearly visible.
Again, it is necessary to mention some reservations and limitations 
regarding the presented data. It may be true that the lower proportion of fines in 
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the countries of Central and Eastern Europe may result from certain particular 
features of their legal systems. Poland is a good example in which the data 
on convictions for law violations of petty nature constituting administrative 
offences are collected separately from the data on convictions for criminal 
offences. Such administrative offences are in practice dealt almost exclusively 
with fines, but these fines are not included to the statistical data on sentencing 
for criminal offences. Therefore, the actual proportion of fines imposed by the 
criminal justice system in Poland for all kinds of prohibited acts is substantially 
higher than the proportion of fines imposed for criminal offences only. The 
precise impact of that factor throughout Central and Eastern Europe may be 
difficult to ascertain. Nevertheless, the actual role played by fines may have 
more effect than what may be inferred from the presented data. Regarding the 
use of suspended sentences, however, there are no reservations. The observed 
differences are without doubt of ‘real’ character and reflect consistent patterns 
of differences between imprisonment and alternative sanctions.
The data presented above seem to indicate that there are two different models 
of alternatives to imprisonment in Europe. Solutions adopted in countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe are clearly based on the traditional, and rather 
outdated, model of the conditional sentence, while in Western Europe fines 
are established as the main type of sanction, accompanied additionally by 
community service and other similar sanctions (although here differences in 
patterns of use are much less consistent). The frequent use, or even abuse, of 
suspended sentences is very often subject to various kinds of criticism. Poland, 
again, is an example (Krajewski 2013). First, some authors argue that such a 
widespread use of suspended sentences proves that the criminal justice system 
is unduly lenient. A large proportion of suspended sentences imposed gives the 
impression – for offenders, victims, and the general public – that there are no 
real consequences, no real ‘pain’ inflicted on a substantial number of those who 
violate provisions of the criminal law. Second, the problem is that a suspended 
sentence usually means no real consequence for the offender beyond the fact 
of being convicted, and therefore being subject to a trial period of a couple of 
years. Although in the legal orders of many countries of the region a suspended 
sentence is considered to be a kind of probationary measure, in fact, it often 
differs from probation in most western European countries. Even in cases in 
which a suspended sentence is accompanied by some sort of supervision by a 
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probation officer (which usually happens only in the minority of such cases), 
this sentence hardly amounts to anything similar to ‘community corrections’. 
Supervision is usually not very intensive and involves very little of social work 
with the convict (van Kalmthout et al. 2003).
However, at least in the case of Poland, it seems to be groundless to argue 
that the criminal justice system is lenient because of the widespread use 
of suspended sentences. It may be true that the proportion of immediate 
imprisonment sentences in Poland (and other countries of the region) is 
low, while the proportion of suspended sentences is high, or even very high. 
Unfortunately, to infer from this that the criminal justice system is lenient 
may be quite wrong. The problem is that a substantial proportion of offenders 
sentenced to a suspended sentence finish, anyway, in prison. In many cases, 
because offenders violate the conditions attached to their suspended sentence, 
or because they commit a new offence during the trial period, courts revoke 
the suspension of the imprisonment sentence and order its execution. This 
may be, by the way, one of the important factors contributing to Poland’s 
enormous prison population. Original decisions of the criminal justice system 
may not send too many offenders behind bars. But subsequent decisions 
regarding suspended sentences may change this situation completely, making 
an impression of undue leniency – a wrong impression.
To sum up, it seems that, despite the potent processes of integration taking 
place since 1990 in Europe in the area of penal policy, the continent seems 
to remain divided into two separate zones of ‘penal climate’. Despite all the 
reforms of penal law and criminal justice systems introduced throughout 
Central and Eastern Europe during the last 25 years, the region remains in the 
zone of a severe ‘penal climate’ and has unquestionable troubles with becoming 
closer to having the mild ‘penal climate’ prevailing in Western Europe. This 
may be surprising. At the beginning of the political, economic, and social 
transformation in Central and Eastern Europe, it seemed that bringing radical 
changes to the criminal justice systems and penal policy, and reshaping them 
according to the standards prevailing in the western part of the continent, 
would have been much easier than levelling off the differences in economic 
development, average income, social security, and infrastructure. It was not 
necessarily so. On the one hand, countries of Central and Eastern Europe have 
a lower registered offence rate, in other words, a lower input to their criminal 
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justice system. And it is that input which is the crucial factor determining 
responses to the crime problem and crime control policies at law-making 
and law-enforcement levels. On the other hand, countries of the region are 
characterized by much higher levels of punitiveness and rather conservative 
responses to the crime problem. This may be seen by the frequent use, or even 
abuse, of imprisonment, resulting in an extremely high imprisonment rate. 
Another important aspect of this phenomenon is the traditional structure of 
sanctions imposed by courts as reflected by the frequent use of suspended 
sentences and the marginal use of fines and community service. In other 
words, the region seems to track far behind most countries of Western Europe 
in regard to modern alternatives to imprisonment.
This paper is limited primarily to providing the diagnosis of the European 
‘penal climates’ and illustrating the divided patterns of penal policy. The 
reasons for this division are a separate issue and beyond the scope of this 
article. Nevertheless, it seems that the most important causal factors are 
the region’s communist past and the persisting influence of Soviet-imposed 
thinking about crime and punishment. This thinking was permeated by rigorist 
and punitive attitudes, with the deeply rooted belief that harsh sanctions 
constitute a panacea for all social problems, and that imprisonment is the most 
important and effective sanction. Such thinking located the Soviet Union and 
its satellites in Central and Eastern Europe in the arctic zone of ‘penal climate’. 
Unfortunately, it seems that, despite all efforts and some unquestionable 
progress toward milder climatic zones, there is no unequivocal evidence to 
support the claim that some sort of ‘regional warming’ of the ‘penal climate’ is 
taking place in Central and Eastern Europe.
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